

TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE	8 June 83
TO: A/NIO/USSR			
ROOM NO.	BUILDING		
7E62	hqs.		
REMARKS:			
FYI			
FROM: Charlie Waterman, VC/NIC			
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION	
FORM NO. 1 FEB 63 241		REPLACES FORM 36-8 WHICH MAY BE USED.	
		(47)	

THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Approved For Release 2007/07/24 : CIA-RDP85T00153R000200050027-6

THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

National Intelligence Council

7 June 1983

Mr. Andrew Marshall
Director, Net Assessments
Room 3A930 Pentagon

Dear Andy:

SUBJECT: Implications for the US
of Probable June Plenum

An interesting, forward-leaning piece on potential opportunities or dangers for us arising from the upcoming June Plenum. It was written by [redacted] of our NIO/ USSR office and is worth a few minutes' perusal. Please note the recent death of Arvid Pelshe, which will assist a pro-Andropov result.



Charles E. Waterman
Vice Chairman

Attachment

National Intelligence Council

7 June 83

Mr. Norman Bailey
Staff Assistant, NSC Staff
Room 373 Old EOB

Dear Norm:

SUBJECT: Implications for the US
of Probable June Plenum

An interesting, forward-leaning piece on potential opportunities or dangers for us arising from the upcoming June Plenum. It was written by [redacted] of our NIO/ USSR office and is worth a few minutes' perusal. Please note the recent death of Arvid Pelshe, which will assist a pro-Andropov result.



Charles E. Waterman
Vice Chairman

Attachment

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THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

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THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

National Intelligence Council


7 June 1983

Mr. Don Gregg
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs
Room 298 Old EOB

Dear Don:

SUBJECT: Implications for the US
of Probable June Plenum

An interesting, forward-leaning piece on potential opportunities or dangers for us arising from the upcoming June Plenum. It was written by [] of our NIO/ USSR office and is worth a few minutes' perusal. Please note the recent death of Arvid Pelshe, which will assist a pro-Andropov result.


Charles E. Waterman
Vice Chairman

Attachment

National Intelligence Council


7 June 1983

Mr. Richard N. Perle
Assistant Secretary
(International Security Policy)
4E838 Pentagon

Dear Richard:

SUBJECT: Implications for the US
of Probable June Plenum

An interesting, forward-leaning piece on potential opportunities or dangers for us arising from the upcoming June Plenum. It was written by [] of our NIO/ USSR office and is worth a few minutes' perusal. Please note the recent death of Arvid Pelshe, which will assist a pro-Andropov result.


Charles E. Waterman
Vice Chairman

Attachment

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

National Intelligence Council


7 June 1983

Mr. Hugh Montgomery, Director
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Room 6531 State Department

Dear Hugh:

SUBJECT: Implications for the US
of Probable June Plenum

An informal speculative piece we
sent to various policy officials which
you may find interesting.


Charles E. Waterman
Vice Chairman

Attachment

National Intelligence Council


7 June 1983

Lt. Gen. James A. Williams
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
Room 3E258 Pentagon

Dear Gen. Williams:

SUBJECT: Implications for the US
or Probable June Plenum

An informal speculative piece we
sent to various policy officials which
you may find interesting.


Charles E. Waterman
Vice Chairman

Attachment

THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

National Intelligence Council


7 June 1983

Mr. Steven W. Bosworth
Director, Policy Planning Staff
Room 7311 State Department

Dear Steve:

SUBJECT: Implications for the US of
Probable June Plenum

An interesting, forward-leaning piece on potential opportunities or dangers for us arising from the upcoming June Plenum. It was written by [redacted] of our NIO/USSR office and is worth a few minutes' perusal. Please note the recent death of Arvid Pelshe, which will assist a pro-Andropov result.


Charles E. Waterman
Vice Chairman

Attachment

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MEMORANDUM FOR: *King*

*I WOULD LIKE TO
SEND YOUR PAPER AS
A "CONTINGENCY" PRODUCTION
TO THE FOLLOWING:*

*STEVE BISWATH, C/SA STATE
NORM BAILEY, NSC PLANNING CHIEF
ANDY MARSHALL, DOD
R. PERLE, DOD
DON GREGG, OVP*

(+ H. MONTGOMERY & GEN. LUCAS)

INFORMAL NOTE

Date

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Company: [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC #3826-83

23 May 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : [REDACTED]
Assistant National Intelligence Officer for USSR-EE

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SUBJECT : Implications for the US of the Probable June Plenum

1. June will be a very important month for Andropov:
 - The Supreme Soviet will meet on 16 June and presumably select the Chairman of its Presidium (head of state or "President").
 - The Central Committee will probably hold its first Plenum this year, possibly during the 13-15 June period. (It normally meets just before the Supreme Soviet session).
 - The probability of a Plenum combined with an uncommonly high level of rumor-mongering about what will happen have fueled expectations that Andropov is about to consolidate his power.

To be sure, we cannot be certain there will be a Plenum; these sessions are not officially announced in advance, and in any case there is no absolute requirement to have one. But, given the expectations and Andropov's need to put a stronger stamp on the political landscape, the failure to hold a Plenum would be clear evidence that the fissures in the Soviet leadership are deeper than now believed. In either event - Plenum or no Plenum - we shall know more about Andropov's power position some three weeks from now. This paper is a brief assessment of what could happen and what it means for the U.S.

2. A word of caution: [REDACTED]

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4. So far, though, Andropov has made only slow progress: He has established himself as the main interpreter of ideology (an important precursor to policy formulation in the Soviet system); sketched out some very limited economic reforms which amount mainly to streamlining; and singled out increased efficiency as the key to revitalizing the Soviet economy, which means stricter cadre accountability and therefore widespread personnel changes. But to implement even his apparently modest substantive program and particularly his more worrisome (to present office holders) cadres policy, Andropov must have a reliable majority in the Politburo.

5. What is the situation today? Unfortunately, analyses of Politburo divisions can never be based on hard facts and are therefore very risky. Still it is worth hazarding an educated guess of a possible Politburo breakdown, not on a particular decision but on general policy and personal lines, so as to bring out what Andropov must eventually do in order to rule effectively. A line-up along the following lines seems plausible:

- The Andropov Group: Himself, Ustinov, Gromyko, and Gorbachev (whose star has risen remarkably since November and whose speeches suggest agreement with the thrust of Andropov's policies).
- An "anti-Andropov" group, not in the sense of a united faction which wants to oust Andropov but rather a group of individuals whose careers stand to be hurt rather than helped by Andropov's further rise and who want to keep him under fairly tight collective constraints: Chernenko, Grishin, Shcherbitskiy, Tikhonov, Kunayev, and Pelshe.
- The leaders with links in both camps: Romanov, who is not associated with the old Brezhnev clique, is ambitious, but who has not (yet?) benefited much from Andropov's ascension; and Aliyev, who has risen during the Andropov era but who is probably enough of an opportunist not to commit himself irrevocably to one side as long as the final outcome is not completely clear.

6. Every Sovietologist probably has his own version of a Politburo breakdown and none could prove that his is correct. The important point is that most agree Andropov's Politburo position is still not all that solid -- a view supported by the vacillating nature of Andropov's discipline

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campaign, clear differences in party organs about as important an ideological issue as the nature of contradictions in the USSR today, and the recurring rumors of Andropov's difficulties. Therefore, if Andropov wants to get away from the domestic immobilism that characterized the Brezhnev years - and his program indicates that he does -, he must change the Politburo political alignment.

7. With this as background, what could happen in June? As stated earlier, it is still possible that there will be no Plenum -- which would mean that Andropov's power is seriously constrained and that the political divisions in the Politburo are very serious. Andropov would have little choice but to continue chipping away at the power bases of his opponents if he is to have any chance of implementing his own program. However, it is much more likely that a Plenum will be held, in which case there seem to be four possible outcomes:

A. A Compromise, Non-Event Plenum. The policy declarations are unclear and any personnel decisions apparent compromises. I would see the filling of the "Presidency" unaccompanied by changes in the Politburo or Secretariat as essentially a draw. If the post were filled by Andropov or one of his allies (Ustinov, Gromyko), it would be a slight improvement in Andropov's position; if it were filled by a surprise candidate, it would probably signify some limited slippage in Andropov's position.

B. A Plenum with an Andropov Tilt. Andropov is clearly shown to be the first among equals: He or one of his allies takes the Presidency job; more importantly, he continues his present tack of gradually making second-tier changes and is able to steer the policy discussions in his direction; but he leaves the Politburo essentially unchanged.

C. A Clear Andropov Plenum. He pushes through a number of top-level personnel changes, the most important of which result in a new alignment in the Politburo, either through expulsions, new members, or a new alliance, or a combination of all three. For instance:

- Ustinov could leave the Defense Ministry to take on another important job ("Presidency", elevation within the Council of Ministers) in which he retains some say over the military-industrial complex;
- This would free up the Defense Ministry, possibly for the apparently politically pliant Commander of the Ground Forces, the recently promoted Marshal Petrov;

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- The ailing octagenarian Pelshe could be retired with honors and replaced as head of the Party Control Committee by the Georgian Party chief and Candidate Member of the Politburo Shevarnadze who has excellent experience in carrying out contained party purges.
- All these moves would entail only one honorable dismissal from the Politburo (Pelshe) but could set the stage for Andropov making at least three new full members: Petrov, Shevarnadze, and Chebrikov (whose elevation may have been signalled during his recent visit to Bulgaria by the unprecedented publicity and honors given a KGB chief).
- There is nothing intrinsically controversial or radical about such changes, or something akin to them, making them hard to oppose. But they would almost certainly give Andropov a political majority since doubters and some erstwhile opponents would most likely rally to the winning side.

D. An-anti-Andropov Plenum. The anti-Andropov leaders manage to unite, demonstrate their power by both personnel moves (for instance a Grishin-Shcherbitskiy seizure of the "Presidency" and Prime Minister slots, with Tikhonov taking the Party Control Committee) and by the way the Plenum is structured (for instance, by having Chernenko make the key ideological pronouncements.) It in its most extreme form, this development would entail the ouster of Andropov.

8. While Outcomes A (Non-Event Plenum) and D (Anti-Andropov Plenum) would be the least worrisome for us as a Soviet leadership preoccupied with power consolidation would likely devote less time and energy to international affairs, they are unlikely in view of Andropov's apparent ascendancy in the last few months. The most probable result falls somewhere between Outcomes B (Pro-Andropov Plenum) and C (Clear Andropov Plenum), meaning that Andropov will probably acquire greater freedom to move decisively in all spheres without fearing that some decision could be used against him by his foes.

9. This probable outcome has a definite foreign policy implication. The further Andropov consolidates his power, the more formidable an adversary the Soviets are likely to be since the lines of authority in Moscow will be clear, the apparatus will function in increasingly integrated fashion, and Andropov will be able to devote more of his time, energy, and cunning to promoting the USSR's interests overseas.

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
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10. For us, this means he will be able to make life all that much harder, either as part of a direct offensive (for instance, by some move to really put us in an "analogous position", or by greater support for insurgency in Central America, or by escalating the Soviet stake in Syria) or as part of an indirect offensive by making concessions to our actual or putative allies in order to split them from us (for instance, by offering concessions to Japan or the PRC, or making a dramatic move in Europe on either troop reductions or the confidence-building measures which are at the heart of the prospective Conference on Disarmament in Europe being pushed by the FRG and France).

11. But there is an obverse side to this as well. An Andropov more firmly in command would also be in a better position to strike a deal with us (for instance on INF) if he thought the circumstances were right. And that is the major implication of the Central Committee Plenum for us: Andropov is likely to emerge from it strengthened and with greater ability either to make life as hard as possible for us or to try to come to some sort of an arrangement with us. To be sure, as we wrote in NIE  "a(n all) encompassing accord on bilateral relations or geopolitical behavior is precluded by fundamentally divergent attitudes toward what constitutes desirable political or social change in the international order." But, paraphrasing that same NIE, "limited accommodations in the areas of arms control or other bilateral issues" could become more possible with Andropov's consolidation of power.



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